Food Safety And In.... The Case Of Beef - Chapter 5 - The United Kingdom

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Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 83 Chapter 5 The United Kingdom1 Introduction The British beef sector is not large by world standards or even by EU standards. Annual beef production in the UK is only 6% of that in the USA and less than 50% of that in France. What makes the UK so interesting to us in this study is its devastatingly bad experience with food contamination problems. If we wanted to study the experience of a country that had this driver for change in the extreme then Britain is it. The layout of this chapter follows the same format as the previous two. We begin with a detailed discussion of the drivers for change, followed by developments in the institutional arrangements in the British beef sector, finishing up with the implications of these developments. Drivers for Change As was done for the USA and Canada, we divide drivers for change in the UK into two types determined by their source: external and internal. The main external drivers for change that are not common with the other countries under review (i.e. not international institutional arrangements) are the EU directives and regulations. At the beginning of 2000, the European Commission (EU) released a White Paper on Food Safety, which has generated considerable attention in the EU generally and also in the UK. This could turn out to be yet another important external driver for change in the UK. The internal drivers for change are the health crises arising from contaminated food, legal innovations associated with the so-called ‘due diligence’ defence for criminal liability, and the strong trend towards own-branded products by the major retailers. The ‘due diligence’ defence together with the rise in ownbranded products has led a drive by the major retailers to develop their own quality assurance programmes with heavy emphasis on traceability of product back to the farm. 83 Food Safety 05 84 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 84 Chapter 5 External drivers for change The EU Directives are legislation proposed by the EC and enacted by the EU Council of Ministers in cooperation with the European Parliament. Individual Member States are responsible for transposing or implementing the directives. There is no single central general Directive on food law. Rather, there has been a proliferation of (five) Directives covering different aspects of food law, some of which impinge on beef. These five Directives are discussed below. The Product Liability Directive This was adopted in 1985 with the principal aim of providing the ground rules for consumers in civil actions against producers of defective merchandise. It applied the rule of strict liability on all those involved in the production process. Thus consumers were able to sue for damages caused by defective products without the need to prove negligence. It was implemented in the UK by the 1987 Consumer Protection Act. Interestingly, Member States could choose to exempt primary producers from the Directive, and most (including the UK) did just that. The Directive only applied to those businesses involved in the production and sale of processed products (e.g. the manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and distributors). However, in 1999, the Directive was extended to specifically include primary producers. Producers affected include farmers, fruit and vegetable growers and fisheries. Importers of such products from non-EU countries are also liable as producers. Others such as wholesalers and retailers are only liable if they fail to identify the producer to an injured person. The Official Control of Foodstuffs Directive This Directive was adopted in 1989 with the aim of achieving a consistent approach to enforcement of food law across all Member States in the lead-up to the Single Market, which occurred in 1992. Its main principles were that: ● ● ● ● food should be inspected regularly at the point of production to avoid the need for border controls between Member States; inspection procedures should be harmonized between Member States; there should be mutual recognition of standards within the EU; and details of Members’ States food law enforcement programmes should be submitted annually to the EC. This Directive was implemented in the UK through the Food Safety Act 1990. This has become a key Act in UK food law, in part because it gave rise to the ‘due diligence’ defence against product liability in criminal proceedings. It will be discussed further in the section on internal drivers in the UK. Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 85 The United Kingdom 85 The Fresh Meat Directive This Directive was adopted in 1991 with the intention of laying down hygiene conditions for all red meat slaughterhouses, cutting premises and cold stores in the Single EU Market. The general principles of this Directive were to: ● ● ● ● ● ● permit the functioning of all operations under hygienic conditions; provide a working environment that protects meat and offal from any risk of contamination during handling, processing or storage; permit clean operations to be carried out separately from those operations liable to give rise to contamination or pollution; produce a flow of products, waste material and personnel such that meat and offal intended for human consumption are protected from any risk of contamination; provide adequate space and facilities for the efficient performance of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections; and protect the welfare of animals at, and during, slaughter. The main implication of this directive for UK legislation was the requirement that all meat produced in the UK had to be fit to move anywhere in the EU. Premises were prohibited from trading unless they were licensed as complying with EU requirements. The implementing regulations in the UK were The Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1995. Under these regulations, the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) was established in the UK. While the Directive was a step in the right direction, there was still a lot of dissatisfaction with meat inspection in the EU. This was highlighted in the EC’s White Paper on Food Safety (January 2000) mentioned previously. The White Paper called the existing EU meat inspection regime outdated and in need of replacement by a more risk-based system. There is considerable consensus within the EU that this should happen. However, for now, the UK must operate within the existing legislation. One area of contention is the requirement of 100% veterinary cover in all but the smallest slaughterhouses. Opponents feel this is a damaging imposition on the smaller slaughterhouses at a time when many are struggling to survive. The Directive on the Registration and Identification of Livestock This Directive was adopted in 1992. It required Member States to register and identify all commercial livestock, including cattle. The idea of cattle identification (via ear tags) had been around for a long time, to control tuberculosis and to record breeding herds. However, the idea of cattle identification for food safety was new. Under Article 4 of the Directive, legal holders of beef animals were required to keep a register stating the number of animals present in the holding and to keep an up-to-date record of all births, deaths and movements. In addition, they were required to supply their national Food Safety 05 86 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 86 Chapter 5 government, upon request, with all information concerning the origin, identification and destination of animals owned, kept, transported, marketed or slaughtered in the EU. Under Article 5 of the Directive, all beef cattle were required to be identified with ear tags bearing an alphanumeric code (not exceeding 14 characters) making it possible to identify each animal individually along with the holding on which it was born. The response of the various EU countries to this directive has been generally slow. The UK was actually one of the first to respond, although this had more to do with the BSE crisis, which reached a peak when the EU instituted a worldwide ban on the export of British meat. One of the conditions for removing that ban was the implementation of a cattle identification system. The UK introduced its cattle passport system in July 1996. And 2 years later, it launched a computerized Cattle Tracing System for recording all cattle and their movements. These UK initiatives will be discussed in detail in the section on institutional arrangements. In other Member States, movement on this Directive has been much slower. In fact in April 1997, the EU Council lamented ‘experience has shown the implementation of the above Directive for bovine animals has not been entirely satisfactory’. The slow pace of reform prompted the introduction of EU Council Regulation 820/97 in April 1997 requiring Member States (with some exceptions) to institute a system of identification of individual beef animals (ear tags and animal passports) by 1 January 1998, and to have a computerized system in place by 1 January 2000. The Hygiene of Foodstuffs Directive The Directive on the hygiene of foodstuffs was introduced in 1993. It laid down general rules of hygiene covering the preparation, processing, manufacture, packaging, storing, transportation, distribution, handling and offering for sale or supply of foodstuffs not covered elsewhere by product-specific (also called ‘vertical’) hygiene directives. This directive required food businesses to take a structured approach to hygiene based on the principles of HACCP, but stopped short of actually requiring the introduction of HACCP. This directive allowed for and indeed encouraged the development of industry guidelines. As such, it was one of the first tangible indications by the EU of a desire to move towards industry self-regulation. In the UK, this Directive was implemented by way of the General Hygiene Act 1995, which required all food businesses to adopt a risk management tool, such as HACCP. According to Bredahl and Holleran (1997): The risk management tool requirement was significant because it marked a shift away from an end-product food safety inspection focus in Britain to a preventative, scientific food safety focus … the 1995 Act assigns ultimate risk management responsibility to the food business proprietor. This Act applied to all premises that manufacture, distribute or sell (processed) meat products but not to primary production (including fresh Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 87 The United Kingdom 87 meat production) that is covered by the ‘vertical’ Fresh Meat Directive discussed above. While these five Directives made useful advances in food safety, the EC had long harboured the view that much more could be done. In a 1997 Green Paper, it argued for the bringing together of all these directives into a single central general Directive on food law. This was followed by the January 2000 White Paper, which went much further. It argued for a new legal framework that would cover the whole of the food chain from ‘farm to table’ with the ability to trace products through the whole supply chain a key issue. Other features of this new legal framework were to include: (i) the use of scientific advice to underpin food safety policy; (ii) the ability to take rapid and effective measures in response to health emergencies; and (iii) to clean up the animal feed sector. The centrepiece of the White Paper was the establishment of an independent European Food Authority. According to the White Paper (page 3): This Authority would be entrusted with a number of key tasks embracing independent scientific advice on all aspects relating to food safety, operation of rapid alert systems, dialogue with consumers on food safety and health issues as well as networking with national agencies and scientific bodies. Other elements of the White Paper include: (i) developing a comprehensive food safety monitoring system; and (ii) strengthening legislation in labelling and advertising so as to ensure consumers receive accurate information. Since its release, the White Paper has received considerable, and generally favourable, public comment by EU stakeholders. The generally positive reception was no doubt helped by the fact the White Paper was released on the heels of yet another food poisoning scare in the EU. This time it was the Belgian dioxin scandal. Dioxin is a cancer-causing chemical that had found its way into animal feed and biomagnified in the fat. Media reports alleged that an animal feed company near Ghent had deliberately or accidentally mixed in industrial oil with the feed. Internal drivers for change It is not always easy to separate out the internal drivers for change from the external ones. Most food legislation in the UK originates from EU Directives or is bounded by the EU legislation. However, EU legislation may, in turn, be driven by events in the UK (as in the case of the BSE crisis). Further, while an EU Directive may provide the basis for implementing legislation in the UK, this legislation will often have its own particular characteristics that lead to its own drivers for change (as in the case of the Food Safety Act 1990). Notwithstanding this difficulty, the following is a list of what appear to be the more significant internal drivers for change in the UK. They include: (i) British legal tradition; (ii) the Food Safety Act 1990; (iii) the concentration of Food Safety 05 88 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 88 Chapter 5 the retail sector; (iv) the strength of the environmental and animal welfare lobbies; (v) public health crises arising from contaminated meat (BSE and E. coli); and (vi) the (Tory) government deregulation initiative. British legal tradition British legal tradition emphasizes the ‘letter of the law’. This tends to distinguish Britain from other Member States that tend to follow the Napoleonic legal tradition that emphasizes the ‘intent of the law’. This can have a significant impact on the way food safety law is interpreted and enforced in the UK. The Food Safety Act 1990 This Act came into force on 1 January 1991. It was the implementing legislation for EU Council Directive 89/397 (The Official Control of Foodstuffs Directive), but it also reflected public health concerns following some highly publicized food poisoning outbreaks like the Salmonella outbreaks in eggs, which occurred in the late 1980s. The Act was intended to induce those involved in the UK food industry to improve their food handling practices by strengthening the powers of enforcement, introducing tougher penalties and increasing the legal responsibility for ensuring that food conforms to the provisions of the Act. In this sense it was a driver for change. However, it also forms an important part of the fabric of institutional arrangements covering the British food sector. Hence, it will be discussed in more detail in the section detailing the institutional arrangements. Concentration of the retail sector in the UK In the UK, five national retailers dominate the market (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Argyll (Safeway), ASDA Wal-Mart and Isosceles (Gateway, Somerfield)). The concentration of retailer power in Britain is very strong and increasing over time. In 1975 the market share of the top five retailers was around 30%. By 1985 it had risen to around 50% and by 1995 it was 70% (Source: NatWest Securities, ACNielson, AGB). In 1994/95, 65% of all consumer purchases of fresh meat were made in UK supermarkets. Part of the phenomenon of retailer concentration has been the growth in own-label products. According to Bredahl and Holleran (1997), by 1996, own-label products accounted for over 30% of all supermarket stock. And for the largest retailers, this figure is much higher. For example, for Sainsbury’s and Tesco it is over 50%. It is important to emphasize that the own-label products in the UK are not aimed at the price-sensitive, quality-insensitive market. Generally, the products are seen as competing head-to-head with the major manufacturers’ brands in the same quality market. Again, according to Bredahl and Holleran (1997), ‘one consequence of the growth in own label is the emphasis it puts Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 89 The United Kingdom 89 on the supplier/retailer relationships in the food industry’. The growth of own-label brands and the institution of the ‘due diligence’ defence have together created a strong driver for supermarkets to develop their own meat quality and safety schemes. As one example, consider Sainsbury’s beef partnership involving around 4000 beef producers who agree to supply cattle under a recognized farm assurance scheme (like the Farm Assured British Beef and Lamb (FABBL) scheme) on a pre-arranged schedule to a specified abattoir according to Sainsbury’s specifications (which cover hygiene, quality, animal welfare and environment standards). The specified abattoir will be one of nine belonging to ABP (Anglo-Beef Processors), the largest processor of livestock in the UK and an integral part of the partnership. The animal welfare lobby Animal welfare has been described as a ‘latent concern’ of consumers to which the major retailers have shown considerable sensitivity. It does appear to be the case that the UK has a long tradition of being an animal-loving nation. A recent survey of consumer attitudes found that British concerns for animal welfare issues were much stronger than in other EU countries (Bansback, 1995). In addition, there is a well organized and effective animal welfare lobby in this country. R. Harrison first elevated public concern in a significant way in the mid-1960s with publication of the book Animal Machines: the New Factory Farming Industry. Public reaction to this book led to the establishment of a UK Government committee to inquire into the welfare of farm animals (the 1965 Brambell Committee) and ultimately to the so-called ‘Five Freedoms’ that dominate discussions about animal welfare to this day. These freedoms are: (i) freedom from hunger and thirst; (ii) freedom from discomfort; (iii) freedom from pain, injury and disease; (iv) freedom to express normal behaviour; and (v) freedom from fear and distress. In more recent years, the main lobby promoting the welfare of farm animals in the UK has been the RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). Beginning in the 1990s, it has undertaken a fairly aggressive advertising campaign targeted at the British educated middle class. One aspect of its programme was the Freedom Food programme which calls for farm animals to be treated in a way as close as possible to the ideal Five Freedoms. The animal welfare lobby in Britain has caused livestock production and transportation methods to be modified to take into account animal welfare concerns. Many of the farm assurance schemes being developed in the UK include codes of conduct for animal welfare. The effect of all this lobbying on consumers is difficult to gauge. An unpublished consumer survey by the Meat and Livestock Commission suggested that when consumers are asked what are the most important concerns they have when they purchase food, animal welfare did not register. However, when they are specifically asked whether animal welfare is an important concern, they will answer yes. This is why animal welfare can be Food Safety 05 90 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 90 Chapter 5 described as a ‘latent concern’. Consumers may not, as a rule, worry about animal welfare when they are in the shop making their meat purchase decisions. However, they may decide to seriously adjust their meat purchases in response to highly publicized allegations of mistreatment of farm animals. It is similar to the effect that the highly publicized allegations of exploitation of workers in Indonesia, who were making Nike running shoes, had upon consumer purchase decisions. What has given added weight to this phenomenon of the ‘latent concern’ in Britain is the highly concentrated retail sector. They face high potential costs if these latent concerns become activated. In addition, through their beef partnerships, they have the wherewithal to protect themselves against such concerns. They have instituted stringent animal welfare codes on the livestock producers in the partnership agreements. Public health crises arising from BSE and E. coli O157:H7 BSE was discovered to affect UK cattle in the mid-1980s. The number of confirmed cases rose to a peak in 1993 of over 1000 new cases confirmed per week. The BSE crisis has been an important food safety issue because it was shown to be transmissible to humans and because of the potentially long incubation period (up to 20 years). However, the BSE crisis was also important because of what it did for the public credibility of the main participants in the crisis. In this section we will focus on four major participants in the crisis (the UK Government, the supermarkets, the abattoirs and the livestock producers). Of these four participants only the supermarkets appear to have largely retained the confidence of the consuming public. They reacted swiftly and decisively to the crisis as it unfolded. The UK Government was widely criticized for dragging its feet on the issue before 1996. In fact, in the early years of the emerging crisis, the UK Government attempted to downplay the risks to humans, a miscalculation that came back to haunt it. The government set up the Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in 1987 to advise on the risk to humans of the disease. It found that meat-and-bone meal used as a protein supplement in cattle feed was the likely means for transmitting the disease to cattle and so recommended a ban on such feed (which was implemented in 1988). However, it also downplayed the risk of transmission of the disease from cattle to humans, arguing that cattle were probably a ‘dead-end’ host for the BSE prion so that humans could still eat cattle brains without risk. In 1990, a scientific surveillance unit was set up to see if there was a connection between BSE and CJD (Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease), a human disease similar in appearance to BSE. This stimulated the first major food scare associated with BSE. The then Minister of Agriculture (John Gummer) downplayed the potential threat telling the National Consumer Council that UK beef was safe and there was no risk to human health. But, in 1992 as the German government banned UK beef and various schools banned beef in school Food Safety 05 4/7/01 4:21 PM Page 91 The United Kingdom 91 lunches, beef consumption in the UK dropped to its lowest level since 1962. The UK Government dispatched experts to assure potential consumers that BSE was not a risk. In 1994, calves (born well after the 1988 feed ban) were found to be infected with BSE. This suggested BSE was transmissible through a second means (apart from feed) – to the calf through either the mother’s milk or via the placenta. This risk was initially denied by the UK Government, but then later accepted. As late as early 1996, the Health Secretary was claiming there was no conceivable link between BSE and CJD. But again, this position was soon reversed in light of scientific evidence. The BSE crisis reached a turning point on 20 March 1996. The UK Ministers of Agriculture and Health made statements to the House of Commons based on scientific advice from the government’s Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) and its Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh. They reported on a new variant of CJD (vCJD) for which the most likely explanation was a link to BSE. SEAC recommended a series of measures including: (i) the disposal of carcasses of all cattle aged 30 months or more; (ii) a ban on the use of mammalian meat-and-bone meal in feed for all farm animals; and (iii) more rigorous enforcement of existing controls in slaughterhouses and other meat plants. The Ministers’ statements were a bombshell which immediately led a number of EU countries to ban imports of British beef and which led, a week later, to an EU announcement of a worldwide ban on British exports of beef animals, meat and meat products. A framework for lifting the ban was agreed by EU Ministers at the Florence Summit in June 1996. The requirements were: ● ● ● ● ● implementation of a selective cull of all bovine animals (born between 1989 and 1993) in the same birth cohort as BSE cases; legislation for the removal of feed containing meat-and-bone meal from farms and feed mills; implementation of the over 30 months (OTM) rule in which bovine animals over 30 months at the time of slaughter must not enter the food or animal feed chains; improved methods of removing specified bovine material (SBM) from carcasses; and an effective animal identification and movement recording system with office registration. The UK Government had already moved to introduce an OTM scheme (regulation 716/96) on 12 April with the reluctant backing of the farm lobby. By the end of 1996, over one million animals had been killed under the scheme. However, the UK Government balked at the idea of the selective cull, doubting its scientific merit. It only agreed to go ahead with the cull in December 1996. The remaining major requirement was the animal identification and movement recording system. Action to develop this began in April 1997 and the cattle passport system was up and running by July of the same year. Food Safety 05 92 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 92 Chapter 5 The credibility of the beef industry also did not fare too well in the wake of the BSE crisis as the industry was seen to be dragging its heels. In many ways this is understandable as there were some large potential costs involved. However, media stories highlighted some abuses. For example, in 1988 the UK Government announced a compensation scheme, which offered 50% of market value to any producer for BSE-affected cattle that would be kept out of the food chain. Allegedly, some producers still put BSE-affected animals through for slaughter in the early years so as not to lose 50% of market value. And in the early 1990s some abattoirs allegedly still sold beef for export knowing it to come from BSEaffected herds. The UK Government responded much more quickly to the outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 infection that occurred in November 1996 in central Scotland. A total of 18 people died in the outbreak and around 500 people were made sick. Not only was there prompt investigation of the outbreak by representatives of the local Health Board, but the UK Government moved quickly to establish an Expert Group (headed by Professor Hugh Pennington) to advise on whether the existing meat safety systems were adequate. The Pennington Group was convened on 28 November 1996. It issued an Interim Report on 31 December 1996 and its Final Report was published in April 1997. One of the main recommendations of the Pennington Report was to introduce mandatory HACCP systems throughout the meat chain (slaughterhouses, cutting plants, meat transportation, food businesses). While it recognized HACCP was currently being negotiated into EU and UK legislation, the Pennington Group thought the UK should accelerate the process. Although the government responded quickly when the outbreak occurred, there were still accusations of a government cover-up. A 1995 report by the MHS entitled Red Meat had warned of the danger of dirty animals being presented for slaughter. According to the report as quoted in The Daily Telegraph (Thursday, 6 March 1997): Dirty animals arriving at the abattoir are a case of further contamination: organisms such as Escherichia O157 and salmonella can be introduced into the plant on the skins of dirty livestock. Most plants have no formal procedures to clean up dirty stock. However, according to the same newspaper story, the government suppressed publication of the report. The upshot of the story, together with the E. coli outbreak in Scotland was the introduction of the MHS’s ‘Clean Livestock Policy’ discussed in the section on institutional arrangements. Government deregulation initiative In October 1992, the then Tory Government launched its deregulation initiative. This included the establishment of a number of taskforces includ- Food Safety 05 4/7/01 4:22 PM Page 93 The United Kingdom 93 ing the Food, Drink and Agriculture Taskforce (FDAT). The FDAT issued its report the following year in which a central concern was the sheer quantity of detailed specifications relating to food law (FDAT, 1993, unpublished report). In 1994, the Cabinet Office Deregulation Unit was established with a view to sweeping away outdated rules and regulations, simplifying paperwork, encouraging consistent enforcement and according to Neville-Rolfe (1997) ‘striking the right balance between cost and benefit when making new regulations, whether domestic or European’. Furthermore, according to the same author, ‘Where new regulation is identified as the best option, (the aim is to) make the regulations goal-based to avoid unnecessary prescription.’ This was supported by Angela Browning MP (Parliamentary Secretary, MAFF) who said (1997, p. 14): The Government recognizes hazard analysis to be a fundamentally important tool in this area. It places clear responsibility on food businesses to manage their operations in a ‘hands on’, systematic and safe way. Hazard analysis provides a far greater assurance that safe food will be delivered than does reliance on prescriptive legislation which can serve to lull food business operators into a false sense of security. Institutional Arrangements The main institutional arrangements impacting on the UK beef safety system can be divided into governmental arrangements and non-governmental arrangements. These are discussed in the next two sub-sections. Governmental arrangements The Consumer Protection Act 1987 The 1987 Consumer Protection Act provides the ground rules for civil liability. It implements the 1985 EU Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), providing strict liability for those involved in the production and sale of food. This means consumers are able to sue for damages caused by defective products without the need to prove negligence. And, while due diligence may provide protection from criminal liability it will not provide protection from civil liability. At time of writing, the Consumer Protection Act does not cover primary farm products. Thus British farmers are exempt from the ‘strict liability’ rule and can only be sued if negligence is proved. However, this will soon change in line with a recent extension of the EU Directive. Under the extended directive, all those involved in the production process, including farmers, would be jointly liable for any defective food products. Food Safety 05 94 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 94 Chapter 5 The Food Safety Act 1990 While the 1987 Consumer Protection Act provides the ground rules for civil liability, the 1990 Food Safety Act provides the ground rules for criminal liability. According to Hobbs and Kerr (1992), the 1990 Food Safety Act was introduced in response to: ● ● ● increasing consumer concern with food safety; the need for harmonization of British law and European Community Law in preparation for 1992 (i.e. the Single Market Initiative); and existing laws that were ill-designed to deal with new and rapidly evolving technologies in the food industry. The Act required all those handling food (or supervising those handling food) to undergo training in food safety procedures and practices. And vehicles carrying food would need to meet new standards of temperature control. The major legal change was the introduction of the due diligence defence in cases of criminal liability for ensuring the safety of food. According to Henson and Northen (1997, p. 89) due diligence is: a defence for the person charged to prove that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence by himself or by a person under his control. This means those engaged in food handling must be proactive in their efforts to ensure that food in their possession conforms to the provisions of the Act. Previous legislation allowed buyers in the supply chain to use the so-called warranty defence. According to Hobbs and Kerr (1992, p. 577): The warranty defence required all those downstream in the food chain to prove only that the food did not enter into a state that contravened the provisions of the food safety legislation while it was under their control. Food purchased from others was deemed warranted, meaning that the seller assumed legal responsibility. This means buyers only had to prove that the food was not compromised while it was under their control. This allowed a buyer to be passive about the food received in a transaction from an upstream supplier. Moreover, an invoice was deemed to be a warranty. Thus, after satisfying the court that the food was handled properly on the premises the firm simply had to supply an ordinary purchase invoice to fulfil its legal responsibility. In order for buyers to use the due diligence defence successfully they have to take all ‘reasonable’ steps to ensure that the food they receive from upstream suppliers is safe. The word ‘reasonable’ is of considerable significance here. It is sufficiently vague that according to Caswell and Henson (1997, p. 222) it creates an air of uncertainty in the minds of the buyer as to what is required: Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 95 The United Kingdom 95 This uncertainty is a key facet of the ‘due diligence’ approach to food product liability which means that, in practice, suppliers implement standards well in excess of legal requirements in an attempt to ensure compliance. Thus, the ‘due diligence’ defence has led to the development of private quality control systems for the major buyers (large processors and major supermarket chains) which far exceed the requirements of the publicly regulated food safety system (associated with the activities of the Meat Hygiene Service). These systems typically require upstream suppliers to participate in very stringent safety and quality programmes (typically involving the principles of HACCP and ISO 9000) and which involve third-party (independent) certification. As Caswell and Henson (1997, p. 223) point out: ‘Whilst these schemes are voluntary in a legal sense, they are fast becoming de facto standards.’ The word ‘reasonable’ also has dynamic content. What may be considered reasonable today may not be considered reasonable tomorrow. Hence, there is a built-in tendency for continual upgrading of the quality control system. In other words, this legislative restructuring has created a regulatory race to the top in the UK. The UK food sector is dominated by large retailers who make extensive use of own-branded products (see pp. 101–105). For such retailers, the ‘due diligence’ defence has a special significance. In the case of ‘own-branded’ products, the retailer is liable rather than the manufacturer. The due diligence defence in criminal liability cases can be distinguished from the US approach, which generally involves strict liability. For further details on this distinction, see Caswell and Henson (1997). The Food Safety (General Food Hygiene) Regulations 1995 The Department of Health (DoH) has responsibility for the implementation of these regulations. They are pursuant to the 1990 Food Safety Act and implement the ‘horizontal’ EU Directive discussed earlier. They concern food hygiene requirements not covered by the EU product-specific (‘vertical’) Directives. Hence, they apply to processed meat products and the retail and catering establishments, and do not apply to the livestock sector or to the fresh meat sector (which includes abattoirs, cutting plants and cold stores). The regulations require food businesses to adopt a risk management tool based on HACCP principles. However, they fall short of requiring a full HACCP system since there is no need for documentation. This is considered too onerous for small corner stores, which may only be selling frozen products. Enforcement of these regulations is at the district (town) council level through the environmental health department with inspections carried out by Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) and assistance being provided by the Public Health Laboratory Service in monitoring the microbiological safety of food. Overseeing and coordinating the enforcement of regulations is LACOTS Food Safety 05 96 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 96 Chapter 5 (the Local Authority Coordinating Body on Food and Trading Standards). LACOTS provides guidance to the local enforcement authorities and advice to the central government on enforcement issues. As may be seen, this is a complicated, multilayered system and it has problems. According to Hobbs et al. (2000): Regulations under the FSA 1990 are enforced to varying standards between Authorities. This can cause problems for nationwide food businesses, despite the existence of the Home Authority Principle which means that the Local Authority within which a major food company has its headquarters is responsible for leading on issues of food law relating to that company wherever it operates in the UK. Food law enforcement competes for funding with other Local Authority responsibilities – such as education and social services. Priority differs across the country and in some areas enforcement suffers. Not only are there problems with enforcement, but as mentioned already, this system is far from comprehensive in providing whole-of-chain food safety. It does not apply to the fresh meat sector, which is regulated at the government level through the MHS. MHS The MHS was created as an executive agency of MAFF in 1995. It came into being through the Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1995. These regulations implemented earlier EU directives, which lay down health conditions for the production and retailing of fresh meat, and which was part of the EU initiative to implement a single EU market in 1992. The MHS was also introduced, for domestic reasons, to standardize meat inspections across the UK, which, like the food businesses discussed in the previous section, were under the control of Local Authorities. Being subject to Local Authorities, some abattoirs were inspected to EU standards while others were not. Thus the inspection protocols and inspection charges could vary dramatically between abattoirs that were close to each other but in different districts (boroughs). Partly, the differences in charges could reflect differences in the thoroughness of the inspections. But also there was a strong sense that the rates charged in a particular plant varied with the fiscal health of the local council, thus giving rise to unfair competition. The MHS is responsible for the inspection of slaughterhouses, cutting plants and cold stores to ensure they meet the government’s fresh meat hygiene regulations. In addition there are mandatory ante-mortem and postmortem inspections of each animal/carcass by an MHS inspector (either a veterinary surgeon directly employed by the government or under contract as a private veterinary surgeon registered by the state) who is paid by the taxpayer. The ante-mortem inspection is to ensure there is nothing obviously wrong with the animal and to ensure animal welfare. The post-mortem inspection involves an examination of the whole carcass and internal organs Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 97 The United Kingdom 97 (to check for disease). At this point the inspector stamps the carcass to say that it is fit for human consumption. The MHS also inspects the treatment of the SBM to ensure it is disposed of properly (and hence to safeguard against BSE entering the food chain). Once the carcass passes inspection it is split and further processed. However, there are no further MHS inspections further downstream. According to one observer: ‘the weakness of the MHS inspection is it is quite possible to take a whole carcass which has been declared fit for human consumption and turn it into something that is unfit for human consumption’. Inspection of the meat further down the supply chain is the responsibility of the private sector. Apart from meat inspections, the MHS was given a mandate to raise standards in licensed slaughterhouses and cutting plants. In its first year of operation it established the baseline Hygiene Assessment System (HAS) scores for all licensed premises. The HAS score is a number between 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating better performance. The system was developed as an objective, risk-based method of assessing hygiene standards. Premises are assessed against performance criteria covering all significant aspects of production each weighted according to their relative risk. Assessments are carried out by an Official Veterinary Surgeon (OVS). These occur at least once a month at full-throughput premises and quarterly in low-throughput premises. Since September 1997, the HAS scores for all plants in the country have been published ‘so that the food industry and consumers can easily see the best and worst in the business’ (Meat Hygiene Enforcement Report, No. 5, September 1997). HAS scores are also used to allow the MHS to identify premises where additional supervision and enforcement action might be necessary. The MHS itself is audited by the State Veterinary Service (SVS). Any significant differences between the HAS scores obtained by the SVS and those produced by the MHS are investigated. In addition, MHS inspection staff are subject to disciplinary action if they approve contaminated carcasses or if they don’t enforce the hygiene regulations. Food Standards Agency (FSA) The proposal for a FSA arose from the British Labour Party in March 1997 as a part of its election platform. The idea was to introduce a major institutional cure for the catalogue of food scares that had faced the British public in the preceding 10 years and which had eroded confidence in the existing system. A request was made to Professor Philip James to produce a report on the function and structure of the proposed agency. The James Report was presented to Mr Tony Blair (leader of the Labour Party) on 30 April 1997. According to the James Report, the problem of ‘eroded confidence’ was not just one of public perception. Rather there were three institutional failings with the existing system. The first institutional failing was that MAFF appeared to have a conflict of interest. It had an important role to Food Safety 05 98 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 98 Chapter 5 play in promoting the economic interests of the agriculture, fishing and food industries, but it was also responsible for protecting public health throughout the food chain (e.g. responsibility for many expert committees in the food safety area, veterinary monitoring and the MHS). Inevitably, there would be conflicts between concerns for food safety and the short-term economic needs of some industry sectors. According to James: What is needed, is a new body, which separates the role of protecting the public health and safety from that of promoting business. Such an Agency must operate openly so that decision-making becomes more transparent and the true balance of interests is subject to public scrutiny. The second institutional failing was that there existed overlaps and gaps between MAFF, DoH and the other departments leading to fragmentation and lack of coordination in the monitoring and control of food safety. There is therefore a need for a single agency to act as a one-stop shop. The third failing was that the enforcement of food law was uneven throughout the UK. Regulations under the Food Safety Act 1990 are enforced to varying standards from authority to authority. In April 2000, the FSA was established as an open, independent organization with functions to: ● ● ● provide advice and information to the public and to the government on food safety from farm to fork, nutrition and diet; protect consumers through effective enforcement and monitoring; and support consumer choice through promoting accurate and meaningful labelling. The FSA is responsible to parliament through the Health Ministers. However, to safeguard its independence it has the unique legal power to publish the advice it gives to the government. With the creation of FSA, responsibility for food safety issues was transferred from MAFF. The MHS, which was previously accountable to the MAFF, was now made accountable to the FSA. Cattle Passports Scheme and computerized database The idea of cattle identification (via ear tags) has been around for a long time to control tuberculosis and to record breeding herds. However, the idea of cattle identification for food safety is relatively new. It began with EU Council Directive 92/102 of 27 November 1992 on the registration and identification of beef (and other) animals. However, the Cattle Passports Scheme was actually initiated as a precondition for lifting the EU beef export ban imposed in March 1996 following the UK Government’s admission of a possible link between vCJD and BSE. It was initiated under the Cattle Passports Order 1996 and came into force in July 1996. Food Safety 05 4/7/01 4:23 PM Page 99 The United Kingdom 99 In September 1998, the cattle tracing system was modified following a new EC regulation (820/97) which required: 1. Animals born after 1 January 1998 were to be identified by an approved ear tag in each ear (double tagging). Double tagging involves a tag in each ear with the same unique identification code which makes it possible to identify each animal individually together with the holding on which it was born. Double tagging provides insurance in case one of the tags falls out. 2. Cattle passports would be compulsory in all Member States from 1 January 1998. 3. A computerized database was to be fully operational by 31 December 1999. 4. An up-to-date on-farm register was to be set up. In the UK, this new regulation was implemented through the Cattle Identification Regulations and managed by the British Cattle Movement Service (BCMS). BCMS was a new public sector organization, and a part of MAFF. It is envisaged that in due course it will move into the private sector or become an executive agency of MAFF. The BCMS maintains a register of births, deaths and imports of cattle, it issues cattle passports and it processes cattle movement information. It is expected to handle over 20 million cattle movements each year. With regard to the specific EU requirements: 1. All beef cattle in the UK are required to be double-tagged within 20 days of birth. There is currently no requirement for electronic tagging. 2. Britain’s cattle passport scheme was already in place in 1996. Farmers must apply for a passport from BCMS within 7 days of tagging. The passports contain information on the animal’s identity, origin and movement. 3. Information about the animal’s movements will be recorded on the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) and the keeper of the animal must report movements to BCMS. The CTS contains information on each animal’s: ● identification code; ● date of birth; ● sex; ● breed or colour of coat; ● identification code of the mother; ● identification number of the holding where born; ● identification numbers of all holdings where the animal has been kept and the dates of each change of holding; and ● date of death or slaughter. 4. Farmers are required to keep a register (either paper- or computer-based) that records the details of births, deaths and movements on to and off the holding. Food Safety 05 100 4/7/01 4:23 PM Page 100 Chapter 5 Beef Labelling Scheme The same EC Regulation (820/97) that introduced new requirements on cattle tracing also introduced the idea of a compulsory Beef Labelling System. All Member States of the EU were required to implement this regulation by 1 January 2000. The underlying principle of an efficient labelling system was held to be the possibility of tracing back any labelled beef to the animal or animals of origin. The compulsory Beef Labelling System was intended to require every label to contain: ● ● a reference code ensuring ‘a link between, on the one hand, the identification of the carcass, quarter or pieces of meat, and on the other hand, the individual animal’; and the Member State or third country where the animal from which the beef derived was: (i) born; (ii) raised; and (iii) slaughtered. The UK implemented the Regulation early (in 1998) through the Beef Labelling Scheme. Under this scheme, detailed labels on fresh and frozen beef must be approved by MAFF and verified by an independent body. The regulation applies to any label other than the basic information, which can be easily checked at point of sale or is already required by law (e.g. weight, cut, ‘best before’ date, storage conditions, cooking instructions, name of manufacturer). The regulation is designed to prevent giving consumers misinformation about the beef product. The following are examples of information for which approval is needed: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● where the beef comes from (i.e. where the animal was born, raised or slaughtered) – if it is desired to label the beef after a particular region, say ‘Scottish’, it is necessary that the animal be born, raised and slaughtered in that region; breed (e.g. Angus); age or sex; identification number of animal; method of production (e.g. organic, extensively reared, grass-fed); method of slaughter (e.g. Kosher); date of slaughter; method or length of maturation; and where a name is given to a product range (e.g. a quality assurance scheme). The basic intent of the rules is to put the onus on the food business to prove that the information being applied is true and to employ an independent third party to verify the system for ensuring this. The scheme is administered by MAFF and approval will only be given once the required guarantees are given. MAFF personnel (Trading Standards Officers or EHOs) will carry out checks on retailers to ensure compliance. Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 101 The United Kingdom 101 Non-governmental arrangements Farm Assurance Schemes Farm Assurance Schemes were developed in the early 1990s, partly in response to the BSE crisis and partly in response to pressure by retailers who saw this as a way of helping to satisfy the due diligence requirement of the 1990 Food Safety Act. The major farm assurance schemes covering beef production were Farm Assured Scotch Livestock (FASL), which began in 1991 and evolved into Scotch Quality Beef and Lamb Association (SQBLA) in 1995, and FABBL that began in 1992. In the beginning, these schemes were more popular among the processors and retailers than among the livestock producers. Many farmers did not see the value of them and resented having to pay the levies and the on-farm inspections. However, once the BSE crisis really started to bite, farmers became much more interested. In the early years, farmers were given financial incentives to join (by premiums and/or forgiveness of the levy). Once a critical number of farmers joined, these inducements disappeared. Membership of one of these schemes has virtually become a de facto requirement for gaining access to the market. For example, the major retailers buy their beef only through partnerships, and if a livestock producer wants to supply this market, membership in one of the recognized farm assurance schemes is essential. One example of a farm assurance scheme is SQBLA that sets standards covering: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● origin of stock; stockmanship and animal welfare; feed composition and storage; housing and handling facilities; medicines and veterinary treatment; movement and record books; (animal) traceability; and livestock loading and transport. Supermarket partnerships overlay these farm assurance schemes with their own requirements. For example, they might include additional quality criteria such as fat class, conformation, particular breed specification, and weight. Meat and Livestock Commission (MLC) The MLC was established under the Agriculture Act of 1967 to assist the development of the pig, beef cattle and sheep industries. It is independent of the government and (unlike the MHS) cannot operate on behalf of the government to determine whether a particular animal is fit or is not fit for human consumption. The MLC receives its funding from two levies plus fees Food Safety 05 102 4/7/01 4:24 PM Page 102 Chapter 5 for service. The general levy is payable in equal shares by livestock producers and abattoirs, while the species promotion levy is payable only by farmers. These funds are targeted at marketing, industry promotion, industry development, commissioned research, technology transfer and industry services. Most of the funding for the MLC comes from fees for service. The MLC carries out a number of industry services that are paid for on a full-cost recovery basis. These services include: livestock farm business consulting; independent carcass authentication service; quality assurance at all levels of the supply chain; and market information. The MLC has played a significant role in encouraging meat safety and quality in the UK. In 1991, it introduced blueprint programmes for British beef, pork and lamb. These blueprints contained a set of recommendations on the best way to handle animals, operate slaughterhouses, meat processors, etc. in order to get a quality commercial product. For example, the beef blueprint contained recommendations in seven areas: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● standards for cattle procurement; standards for the loading and transport of live cattle; standards for abattoirs and cutting plants; specifications for carcasses and sides/quarters; specifications for primal and retail cuts; recommendations for cutting methods; and recommendations for labelling. The major retailers were receptive to the MLC blueprints, which they used as a basis for determining the characteristics of their premium products. Building upon the blueprint initiative, and in response to reports of shoddy practices at some abattoirs, the MLC undertook two new initiatives to further enhance UK meat quality and safety. They were: (i) to develop the Assured British Meat (ABM) initiative, which is discussed in detail in the next section; and (ii) to provide independent safety and quality audits of meat plants. Let’s take a closer look at (ii) here. You may recall from earlier discussion, we said the MHS provided ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections at abattoirs to ensure some minimum level of food safety was attained. However, we also said it was quite possible to take a whole carcass, which the MHS had declared fit for human consumption, and turn it into something that was unfit for human consumption by substandard hygiene practices further downstream. The major retailers were particularly concerned about this because of the recently introduced Food Safety Act. They were looking for a way to audit their suppliers and hence show due diligence (as this could be used in a court of law as a defence against criminal liability for selling unhygienic food). After 1990, retailers began to hire their own food safety technicians to audit suppliers to ensure they (their suppliers) met their food safety and quality criteria. Each retailer developed its own set of standards of safety and quality. Then a few independent companies emerged to provide independent audits of the suppliers’ premises, procedures and practices against an approved standard. Food Safety 05 4/7/01 4:24 PM Page 103 The United Kingdom 103 In 1994, MLC formed a joint venture with Campden & Chorleywood Food Research Association, which they called EFSIS (European Food Safety Inspection Service). EFSIS was one of the few independent auditing companies, which rose to prominence at this time. Apart from EFSIS, the main auditing firms include Law Laboratories, Total Legal Compliance and National Britannia. EFSIS became the largest of such auditing services in the UK with 65% of the UK market. EFSIS provides two levels of acceptance for food supply firms: ● ● food supply status – where there is a guarantee of safe food; and accredited standard – where the firm complies with every element of the standard. The ‘accredited standard’ takes into account other factors in addition to food safety, such as animal welfare, environmental impact and traceability. Actual requests for audits may come from manufacturers or from retailers. However, the manufacturer generally pays for the audit. Recently, EFSIS separated its association with the MLC becoming a completely self-financed company. This was to ensure no possibility of a conflict of interests between the activities of MLC and EFSIS and to meet the requirements of the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS). ABM and the British Farm Standard Mark The UK beef supply chain includes many vertically related participants. They include feed producers, feed compounders, livestock producers, livestock transporters, livestock markets, abattoirs and cutting plants, processors, wholesalers, caterers, and retailers. In some sectors there are a number of programmes. For example, in the case of beef cattle production there are regional programmes such as FABBL and FASL, and in the case of independent butchers there are programmes like Q Guild, Shop With Assurance (in England) and Shop With Confidence (in Scotland). In addition to these different horizontal programmes there are also different vertical programmes run by the large supermarket chains. The large supermarket chains operate their own quality assurance schemes which require participants to adhere to their particular safety and quality standards and inspection protocols. One example of a supermarket scheme is Sainsbury’s Beef Partnership with ABP and about 4000 beef producers. The beef producer members must not only belong to a farm assurance programme (like FABBL) but also agree to meet other more stringent specifications (e.g. on production methods) and agree to deliver their cattle to a specially selected abattoir (which is also part of the programme) on a pre-arranged schedule. In response to the proliferation of standards and the low consumer confidence, the MLC launched an initiative in 1995 to develop single national core standards for each component of the beef supply chain and to provide traceability of product throughout the supply chain. This initiative evolved Food Safety 05 104 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 104 Chapter 5 into ABM, which was incorporated as a company (limited by guarantee) in May 1997. The stated mandate of ABM was to establish ‘an integrated assurance scheme to restore and maintain confidence in the safety and wholesomeness of British meat’. The emphasis was on developing ‘core assurance’ standards rather than ‘quality’ standards. These core standards were based on food safety and related welfare and environmental issues. The thinking was that the various participants in the supply chain could agree to treat these as non-competitive issues and hence reach a consensus. This contrasts with quality standards, which are viewed as competitive issues. The idea was to develop a set of national sectoral assurance schemes (i.e. at different levels of the supply chain) all linked together so as to provide whole-of-chain food safety. It would not replace existing sectoral schemes like FABBL, but rather would work to modify them where necessary to meet the core standards, inspection protocols and linkage requirements. The linkage requirements would be met by having each sector require, as part of its specification, that the preceding sector be certificated (i.e. have its own standards and inspection protocol approved by an independent body). This process has now been completed, so there are now standards set for all components of the supply chain including feed manufacturers, farmers, livestock markets, livestock transporters, abattoirs, secondary wholesalers, catering butchers, specialist and traditional butchers, and multiple retailers. Initially, ABM was involved in certification and inspection of members of the scheme. To this end, it achieved UKAS accreditation to European Standard EN 45011.2 Enrolment in the scheme was voluntary, but members were required to adhere to the safety and allied standards. Non-compliance would lead to suspension and ultimately exclusion from the scheme (subject to an appeal system). ABM is a very ambitious initiative as there are a large number of players involved with different, and sometimes conflicting, interests. In the UK, there are about 100,000 farms, 350 livestock markets, 350 abattoirs, 3000 outlets of the major retailers and 8000 independent retailers. An example of conflicting interests is between the major retailers and the National Farmers Union (NFU). The interests of supermarkets would be best served by a quick application of stringent standards, which would exclude a large number of low-performing producers. However, the interests of the NFU would be best served through a slow increase in standards so as to protect its members from exclusion. There was consensus that ABM has done a good job both in developing an integrated set of (core) safety and allied standards right along the supply chain. However, there was also criticism that ABM was not being sufficiently aggressive in establishing a presence in the British meat market. Membership in the ABM scheme had not met expectations. Hence, in early 2000, the NFU launched a new initiative (in consultation with the MLC) called the British Food Safety 05 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 105 The United Kingdom 105 Farm Standard Mark. The idea of this initiative was to boost farmer membership in the ABM’s farm quality assurance scheme and boost the sale of British farm produce (including beef) by giving consumers proof of quality in the form of a trade mark, a red, white and blue sticker representing a tractor. According to an ABM press release (30 March 2000): ABM’s new role will be to independently underpin food standards and associated product marks across all food production chains. An immediate priority will be to assure the standards for the new British Farm Standard Mark. The press release went on to say: The new role for ABM will involve stepping back from providing frontline commercial operations, which will provide greater choice in the future provision of independent certification and inspection services. Implications of these Developments The restructuring of the UK food safety system has been driven by internal crises, yet unlike the US, it has been bounded by an important external force: EU legislation in the form of directives and regulations. As a result, the UK trajectory has been: to react to decreased consumer confidence through an explicit focus on consumer protection in a manner that is both acceptable to the British consumer and congruent with EU legislation. The objective of this section is to discuss this proposition in more detail. The restructuring in the UK, similar to the USA, is focused on regaining lost consumer confidence. However, in the UK, the government was viewed as having failed the public, while this was not the case in the USA. In the UK, the one group to retain consumer confidence in the dark, early days of the BSE crisis was the major supermarket chains. The implications of the lost consumer confidence for the role of government were thus quite different in the two countries. In the USA, we saw a move to more government intervention and more stringent regulations, while in the UK we saw a move towards reorganized and refocused government intervention. In the USA, responsibility for meat food safety remains in the hands of the USDA, an agency that has both a consumer protection and a producer promotion mandate. By contrast, in the UK, responsibility for consumer protection has been shifted from MAFF to the new FSA. The major supermarket chains in the UK have also become a more important influence in recent years in leading whole-of-chain initiatives to ensure food safety. In part, this is to be expected because the retail sector is becoming increasingly concentrated and the due diligence defence has been an important spur to such developments. But perhaps their focus on building and maintaining trust Food Safety 05 106 29/5/01 2:36 pm Page 106 Chapter 5 with the consumer has also been a factor. The major supermarket chains have moved vigorously to introduce their own form of market regulation (i.e. the retail partnerships with independent audits of suppliers) which has been superimposed on top of the government’s legal regulation. While the UK Government struggles to regain consumer confidence by focusing on improving food safety per se, the supermarkets have vigorously moved to link enhanced food safety with enhanced industry competitiveness. The UK supermarkets have done this by focusing on whole-of-chain restructuring of the food safety system. This does not appear to be happening to the same degree in the USA and Canada. In the USA, the emphasis on improving food safety is still predominantly focused at the slaughter/processing stage of the supply chain. And since Canada is primarily driven by developments in the US market, the same story applies there. There are two important challenges facing the restructuring of the UK beef safety system. First, there is the increasingly concentrated nature of British beef retailing and the beef partnerships. On the plus side, the vertical partnerships (i.e. retailers with processors and through them with livestock producers) can lead to a safer, more responsive and more competitive beef supply chain. On the negative side, the increasingly concentrated nature of the retail sector can lead to increasingly large market power imbalances. The retailers can use their power for market regulation to impose their own safety and quality enhancements on upstream producers with very little cost to themselves. Second, UK food law is bounded by EU legislation. Thus, the UK does not have the same flexibility as the other countries under study to restructure its food safety system in a way it considers optimal. Moreover, free trade between the various countries of the EU means the UK cannot prevent beef from other EU countries being imported provided they meet the EU standards. This completes the UK leg of our journey. It is now off to Australia where economic rationalism is not just a theory, but also a political ideology for a number of successive governments. Economic rationalism has carved a wide swathe across Australia’s socio-economic landscape, including that part called food safety. Notes 1. The authors wish to acknowledge the help provided by Susan Hornibrook, Wye College, Kent, UK, who provided some background research for this chapter. 2. This standard was adopted by the EU in 1989 and has three main principles: independence; third party checks on standards; and normative documentation against which standards can be measured.